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CONSTRUCTIVE CIGARETTE REGULATION
W. KIP VISCUSI†
Professor W. Kip Viscusi argues for a move away from the adversarial approach to tobacco regulation, an approach that is currently
embodied in class action lawsuits and the proposed broadening of
FDA regulatory power over cigarettes. In this Article, he suggests that
the FDA should take a constructive role in fostering technological innovations to promote cigarette safety, in much the same way that the
government currently fosters safety improvements in motor vehicles
and jobs. Professor Viscusi claims that the objective of government
policy should be to promote informed consumer risk taking—an approach which recognizes that adult consumers have a right to smoke
and to incur the associated risks. He provides survey data demonstrating that although consumers know that smoking is a risky decision, they have little exposure to information regarding the comparative riskiness of various cigarette brands.
According to Professor Viscusi, the government should assist in
compiling and disseminating information regarding the comparative
risks of different smoking options and the effects of certain innovative
safety features for cigarettes. Making this information available would
enable consumers to make more informed smoking decisions and potentially minimize the health hazards that smoking poses.

INTRODUCTION
For over three decades, cigarettes have been the subject of substantial federal regulation. Mandatory hazard warnings,1 restrictions

† John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics and Director of the Program on
Empirical Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. Professor Viscusi presents the arguments he
first made on March 6, 1998, at the Duke Law Journal’s 1998 Administrative Law Conference.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38 & tbl.1 (discussing the evolution of federal
legislation requiring cigarette warning labels); cf. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health
Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408
(1994)) (requiring warning labels and ingredient disclosure on smokeless tobacco products and
establishing a public health education program to increase risk awareness).
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on advertising,2 limitations on sales to minors,3 and public smoking
restrictions4 are among the most significant forms of cigarette regulation. In addition, cigarettes are subject to considerable federal and
state excise taxes, which averaged fifty-six cents per pack in the year
ending June 30, 1997.5 These taxes serve to discourage the purchase
of cigarettes,6 and to shift more than thirteen billion dollars annually
from smokers to the rest of society.7
Recent developments in the national smoking debate herald the
emergence of a more aggressive regulatory regime. The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) will likely play a primary role in this
new regime. As Cass Sunstein and Richard Merrill discuss in articles
in this symposium,8 if the FDA’s recent assertion of jurisdiction over
cigarettes is upheld, it will mean a much more stringent regulatory
era for cigarettes. Moreover, tobacco legislation now being considered by Congress presents a substantial prospect for more aggressive
federal regulation. The “Proposed Resolution” that emerged in 1997
as a result of the negotiations between the cigarette industry and the
State Attorneys General9 is intended to be a framework for congressional legislation.10 The Proposed Resolution includes a greatly ex2. See, e.g, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994) (making it “unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little
cigars on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission”).
3. See Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Reorganization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-321, § 202, 106 Stat. 323, 394-95 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994)) (requiring
states to prohibit the sale of tobacco products to individuals under age eighteen in order to receive federal mental health funds under the act).
4. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (1994) (prohibiting smoking in the passenger cabin of domestic airline flights).
5. See THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, THE TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO viii (1997). This figure represents the sum of the federal tax for fiscal year 1997 ($0.24) and the average state tax
for the year ending June 30, 1997 ($0.32). See id.
6. Taxes on cigarettes raise the price consumers must pay. Higher prices will discourage
cigarette smoking if the demand for cigarettes is a decreasing function of the price. For evidence of the negative price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, see W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING:
MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 102-05 (1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI, SMOKING].
7. See THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at vii.
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 48 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998); Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Attempt to Regulate Tobacco
Products: Audacious and Anomalous, 48 DUKE L.J. 1071 (1998).
9. For text of the Proposed Resolution, see Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Settlement
Document (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/html/settlement_document.
html> [hereinafter Proposed Resolution].
10. On April 8, 1998, the major tobacco companies, led by R.J. Reynolds, withdrew from
the negotiations. See David E. Rosenbaum, Cigarette Makers Quit Negotiations on Tobacco
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1998, at A1. Although no bill embodying the Proposed Regulation has
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panded role for the FDA. Since this expanded role would be enacted
through new legislation rather than through interpretation of existing
legislation, Professor Merrill and Sunstein’s debate about the statutory basis for an expanded FDA role would no longer be pertinent if
such sweeping legislation is passed.11
Included among the many FDA provisions in the Resolution are
the following:
•

The FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco products under the
12
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act would be confirmed.

•

The FDA would be given the authority to regulate the levels of
13
nicotine in tobacco products.

•

The FDA would be given the authority to restrict tobacco ad14
vertising to media it specifies.

•

All claims regarding “light” or “low-tar” cigarettes would have
to be accompanied by a disclaimer submitted to the FDA for
15
approval.

•

The FDA would be required to issue rules pertaining to the
“testing, reporting and disclosure of tobacco smoke constituents . . . including, but not limited to ‘tar,’ nicotine and carbon
16
monoxide.”

yet been introduced in Congress, the Proposed Regulation does bear some similarities to proposed legislation, such as the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
This bill, introduced by Senator McCain, would impose a much higher cost burden on the cigarette industry and would not give the tobacco companies immunity from lawsuits, but it does
include similar provisions regarding warnings and the role of the FDA. See id. § 111, 142; see
also Rosenbaum, supra (comparing major provisions of McCain Bill and the June Settlement).
The tobacco companies that negotiated the Proposed Resolution have stated their
“‘unequivocal’ opposition” to the McCain bill. See McCain Vows to Keep Pushing Tough Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at A24. The Senate Commerce Committee approved the
McCain bill with strong bipartisan support. See Rosenbaum, supra.
11. See Merrill, supra note 8; Sunstein, supra note 8.
12. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 9, at 2.
13. See id. at 3.
14. See id. at 8.
15. See id. at 9.
16. Id. at 11.
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•

The FDA would have to approve all health claims for lower risk
17
tobacco products.

•

The FDA could issue performance standards for cigarettes in18
cluding specifying a reduction in nicotine yields.

These provisions, and those in other possible legislative resolutions of the tobacco litigation, would clearly create a prominent role
for the FDA in regulation of the cigarette industry. While the proposal has not yet been adopted by Congress, many of its specific
components could be incorporated into future legislation and are indicative of the kinds of regulatory initiatives that might have broad
support. Thus, the main question is not whether there will be extensive FDA regulation of cigarettes, but, rather, what form such regulation should take.
The government may regulate risky products in several ways.
First, the government may regulate the flow of information regarding
a product—either by providing hazard warnings or by restricting advertising. Hazard warnings are required for a wide range of products—from lawn mowers to prescription drugs—and have been one
of the primary ways that the government has regulated cigarettes.
While the content of these warning labels has changed over the past
several decades, the government has continually required that some
type of warning be included on cigarette packaging and in cigarette
advertising.19 Prohibition of cigarette ads on television or near
schoolyards is also a form of informational regulation since it limits
what information the industry can provide through various media.
A second form of regulation is alteration of the character of the
product itself. Health and safety standard regulations mandate various kinds of safety improvements. For example, regulatory agencies
have specified the height and dimensions of handrails,20 mandated the
installation of seatbelts and airbags in cars,21 and even established

17. See id. at 14.
18. See id. at 15.
19. Cigarette warning labels were first required with the passage of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)). Since that time, the federal government has twice altered the
content of these warnings by statute. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38 & tbl. 1.
20. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.29(f)(4) (1997) (prescribing handrail requirements for mobile ladder stands).
21. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1997).
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flammability standards for children’s pajamas.22 In contrast, the government has never subjected cigarettes to similar kinds of technological requirements aimed at promoting safety. There has been, for example, no effort to require filters on cigarettes or even to identify,
apart from tar and nicotine information, which cigarettes are safer.
Indeed, the government has inexplicably discouraged safety improvements for cigarettes.23
The most extreme form of regulation is a total ban on the product. Currently, twenty-five percent of the adult population in the
United States continues to smoke.24 Although it is feasible to limit the
age at which people can buy cigarettes and the kinds of cigarettes
that are sold, it seems unlikely that a complete ban would be fully effective.25 Moreover, even anti-smoking activists have not claimed that
the market failure is so great that a complete ban is necessary. There
have been calls for an end to smoking, but there has been no major
effort to achieve this outcome through a ban.
For over three decades, the government has mandated warnings
on cigarette packages, restricted cigarette advertising, and undertaken a variety of public information campaigns to educate the public
about the general risks of smoking. As the data I present in Part II
indicates, this mission of informing the public has largely been accomplished. These health risks of smoking are almost universally understood.
What is needed now is a regulatory effort that goes beyond simple warning messages and promotes cigarette safety in the same way
that the government fosters the safety of various other products.
Rather than stimulating safety innovations, the FDA has taken an
adversarial position and discouraged the promotion of safer cigarettes, focusing instead on eliminating smoking behavior. This Article
advocates a regulatory policy shift, contending that the government
should undertake two new kinds of policies to promote greater safety
in cigarettes, in much the same way that the government fosters
greater safety in motor vehicles and in the workplace.

22. See 16 C.F.R. § 1615.3 (1998).
23. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 145
(117th ed. 1997).
25. As the paper in this Symposium by Joni Hersch indicates, even age restrictions on
cigarette purchases may not be fully effective. See Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking Behavior and the
Regulatory Environment, 47 DUKE L.J. 1140, 1151-55 (1998).
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First, as I discuss in Part III, the government should develop a
comprehensive rating system that indicates the hazards associated
with different cigarettes in order to assist consumers in matching
cigarette characteristics with their risk preferences. Such an aggressive comparative risk information policy would exploit the market
forces reflected in the greatest shift in smoking behavior in the past
half century—the decrease in the average tar level of cigarettes.26
Consumer demand for safer cigarette products is substantial,27 and
the government should develop a safety rating system that would inform consumers of risk characteristics of cigarettes in a manner that
goes beyond the current tar and nicotine ratings.
Second, as I discuss in Part IV, the government should encourage technological advancements in cigarette design that reduce either
the health hazards of cigarettes or their nicotine content. These technological advancements may be quite radical and may substantially
change the character of the cigarette—as the Premier cigarette, developed by R.J. Reynolds, indicates.28 Manipulating product character
through safety devices is a well-established regulatory approach. Of
course, questions remain regarding the safety of these advances compared to currently marketed cigarettes. The FDA could assume a
leadership role by encouraging advancements in cigarette safety, by
rating the comparative riskiness of products that reflect these new
safer designs, and by promoting, rather than discouraging, consumer
purchase of such safer cigarettes.
Underlying this regulatory proposal is a general assumption that
the objective of government policy should be to promote informed
consumer risk-taking. A move to this constructive approach would
require that the FDA abandon its current anti-industry stance. Informed choice requires that consumers understand not only the overall hazardousness of smoking, but also the relative risks of different
smoking choices. Promotion of informed choice recognizes that adult
consumers have a right to smoke and to incur the associated risks.
Expanding the range of consumer choice by encouraging the introduction of safer cigarette designs would be consistent with the appro-

26.

See infra text accompanying notes 76-80 (discussing the great “Tar Derby”) and Figure

1.
27. This demand for safe cigarettes is reflected in the dramatic decline in the tar levels of
cigarettes, as compared to trends in per capita consumption of cigarettes overall. See VISCUSI,
SMOKING, supra note 6, at 63 n.37.
28. See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
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priate recognition of consumers’ rights to make product choices that
are reflective of their preferences.
I. WHY REGULATE TOBACCO?
By any standard, cigarettes are a very risky product. The estimated incremental lifetime mortality risk associated with smoking is
between one-sixth and one-third.29 Even though the loss in life expectancy is considerably less than for acute accidents that lead to premature loss of life,30 the risks associated with smoking are quite large. By
contrast, the annual probability of being killed as a result of a workrelated injury averages under 1/10,000 in the United States.31 Even if
one assumes a thirty-year work life, this lifetime job risk is under
1/300, or one hundred times smaller than the upper bound estimate
of the lifetime risk associated with smoking. Similarly, compare the
risk level currently used by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency in determining whether to clean up hazardous waste sites.
Cleanup of a site is mandated when the individual lifetime cancer risk
reaches 1/10,000.32 Cleanup is discretionary for risks of between
1/10,000 and 1/1,000,000.33 Risks of this magnitude are significantly
smaller than those posed by cigarette smoking.
The mere existence of a large risk, however, is not a legitimate
rationale for government regulation. If the risk is taken voluntarily,
those who incur the risk presumably are receiving some compensating benefit, whether it be in the higher wages of a risky job or in the
pleasure of cigarette smoking.34 In a world of rational choice, with full
29. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 80.
30. The life years lost for various accidents vary depending upon the age of the victim.
Firearms accidents lead to an average loss of almost 46 life years, drownings lead to a loss of 43
years, and accidents overall lead to a total life year loss of 29 years. See W. Kip Viscusi et al.,
Measures of Mortality Risks, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 213, 220 (1997).
31. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 24.
32. The risk cutoffs for cleanup are specified in internal EPA documents. See Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, OSWER Directive No.
9355.0-30, Role of the Baseline Risk Assessment in Superfund Remedy Selection Decisions
(1991). For a discussion of these cutoffs, see James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly
is “Clean”? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. (forthcoming March 1999). For an extensive discussion of the Superfund
cleanup program, see W. Kip Viscusi & James T. Hamilton, Cleaning up Superfund, PUB.
INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 52, 52-60 [hereinafter Viscusi & Hamilton, Cleaning up Superfund].
33. See Viscusi & Hamilton, Cleaning up Superfund, supra note 32, at 55.
34. This is the classic theory of compensating differentials. See ADAM SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 112 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776). Smith observes: “First, The wages
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information, there would be no rationale, from the standpoint of improving individual welfare, for interfering with these decisions. Thus,
the key question with respect to regulating smoking behavior as it affects smokers’ health is whether a person’s decision to smoke is itself
made with adequate information about smoking. This focus is consistent with the usual economic approach for goods traded in markets—
consumer error and lack of information should be the key triggers of
potential intervention.35
A major theme of this Article is that assessing the adequacy of
consumer information involves much more than simply asking
whether consumers are aware that smoking is risky. Even if there is
widespread knowledge of the health risks of smoking, there may be,
nevertheless, a constructive role for government action. A general
awareness of the hazards of smoking does not provide consumers the
specific information they need to understand the significant differences among brands of cigarettes, nor does it create incentives for
cigarette companies to provide the kinds of cigarettes that are most
in line with consumer preferences. Ideally, people should be able to
determine the comparative risks of different smoking options.
II. DO WE NEED MORE WARNINGS?
Informational regulations have become a foundation of right-toknow efforts that seek to apprise citizens of risks from environmental, product, and occupational exposures. Historically, a primary
tool that the federal government has used in its efforts to reduce
smoking is the requirement that hazard warnings be placed on cigarette packs and in cigarette advertising.
Beginning in 1965, Congress required that cigarette companies
inform consumers that “Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to
Your Health.”36 This warning was modified in 1969 to indicate that
“The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is
Dangerous to Your Health.”37 In 1984 Congress instituted a series of
four rotating warnings regarding the health hazards of cigarettes, the
of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment.” Id.
35. For a review of product safety regulation and the rationales for it, see W. KIP VISCUSI
ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 751-89 (2d. ed. 1995).
36. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282, 283 (amended 1970).
37. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87, 88
(effective July 1, 1970) (amended 1984).
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benefits of quitting smoking, the risks to pregnant women, and the
presence of carbon monoxide in cigarette smoke.38 Table 1 summarizes the text of the warnings that have been in place from 1965 up to
the present.
TABLE 1. CIGARETTE WARNING CONTENT SUMMARIES
Warning period

Warning content

1965-1969

“Caution: Cigarette Smoking May
Be Hazardous to Your Health.”

1969-1984

“Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to
Your Health.”

1984-present
(rotating)

1. “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking
Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.”
2. “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting
Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to
Your Health.”
3. “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking
By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury,
Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.”
4. “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Cigarette
Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.”

The Proposed Resolution contains a new warnings policy that
does not depart dramatically from prior practice. It includes a series
of nine rotating warnings. Table 2 displays the text of these proposed
warnings.39
TABLE 2. CIGARETTE WARNINGS MANDATED BY PROPOSED RESOLUTION

38. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200, 220102 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1994)).
39. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 9, at 10.
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OF TOBACCO LITIGATION

“WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive”
“WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children”
“WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease”
“WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer”
“WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease”
“WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby”
“WARNING: Smoking can kill you”
“WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers”
“WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious
risks to your health”

Whereas earlier warnings alerted consumers to several hazards
in a single warning, the proposed warnings would isolate fatal lung
disease, cancer, and strokes and heart disease in separate warnings.
For the first time, the warnings would designate cigarettes as being
“addictive” and would alert smokers to the risk of “fatal lung disease
in nonsmokers.”40 The proposal also contains the very explicit warning, “[s]moking can kill you.”
The principal policy question is whether or not such warnings
will make a difference. If warnings are to be effective, they must convey new information in a credible and effective manner.41 The question then is twofold. First, do the proposed warnings convey any information that is truly new? Second, is the warning information
received, processed, and credible? The warnings in the Proposed
Resolution appear to contain little information that smokers have not
already heard.
Consider smokers’ awareness of the health risks of smoking.
Data from a 1985 national survey and a 1991 regional telephone survey conducted in the Durham, North Carolina, area indicated that
40. The focus of this second-hand smoke, or Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS),
warning is surprising in that the available studies of ETS suggest that the risks of heart disease
may dwarf the hazards of lung disease. See W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social
Consequences of Smoking, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 78-92 (James M. Poterba
ed., 1995).
41. See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION 87-106 (1992); W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 132-55
(1991); W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 125-30 (1987) [hereinafter VISCUSI &
MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK].
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smokers were aware of the fatal lung cancer risks and the mortality
risks of smoking.42 This Article supplements the previous literature
with new survey evidence based on a national telephone survey undertaken in February 1997.43 The sample consisted of 982 people, of
whom 234 were smokers.
When eliciting risk perceptions regarding smoking, the key factor is how the health outcome is defined. It is noteworthy that the
health outcomes that I focused on, lung cancer and death risks, are
both well-defined and severe risks. The results from earlier surveys
indicate that the responses to a lung cancer risk question are very
similar to those of a lung cancer mortality risk question.44 This 1997
survey included a lung cancer risk question to provide comparability
with the 1985 national survey.
A second factor that affects the meaningfulness of the survey is
how the risk question is asked. The approach I have taken in this and
in past surveys is to establish a well-defined quantitative metric so
that different people could rate the degree of hazards in a comparable fashion. Thus, simply asking people whether smoking is “risky”
has no meaningful quantitative content because different people may
have different ideas about what constitutes a “risky” product. To
eliminate that problem, I worded the lung cancer question as follows:
“Out of every 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will develop lung cancer because they smoke?”
Although this question asks for an overall risk rating, not the
specific risk to the smoker, it is the most natural way to elicit a probability assessment. Respondents to an objective risk scale give answers that in past studies have reflected risks to themselves, not simply risks to others. Workers confronting a similar linear probabilistic
scale gave job risk assessments that closely parallel the objective risks
of the workers’ jobs.45 These subjectively reported risk perceptions on
42. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 76-80.
43. As in the case of the national survey undertaken in 1985, the research firm used for
this new survey was Audits & Surveys, Inc., of New York.
44. The 1991 regional sample believed that the lung cancer mortality risk was 0.38. See
VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 77. The 1985 national survey found that the population
perceived the lung cancer risk as 0.43, see id. at 69, and the 1997 national sample believed that
the lung cancer risk was 0.47. The statistics from the 1997 survey and the exact wording of the
survey question appear in Table 3 infra. These statistics were calculated by the author using the
raw data files compiled by the surveyors.
45. See W. Kip Viscusi & Charles O’Connor, Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labels, 74
AMER. ECON. REV. 5 (1984). The implication is that using objective risks scales such as the
ones that I have used have in fact generated a variety of market responses to the risk, which is
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the part of workers generated similar wage premiums for risk, as
have been found in compensating differentials studies using objective
job risk data for worker industries.46 A final factor indicating that
people think that smoking is as risky for themselves as they think it is
for others is that smoking risk assessments have a substantial effect
on the smoking probability. If the hazards of smoking were only pertinent to others, not to the respondent, they should not affect the respondent’s smoking behavior. Based on the earlier 1985 survey results, I found that if people understood the lung cancer risk of
smoking accurately, as opposed to overestimating it,47 the societal
smoking rate would increase by 6.5-7.5%.48
The 1997 survey results, reported in Table 3, show a substantial
perception of the lung cancer risk associated with smoking. Overall,
people believe that there is a 47% chance of developing lung cancer
from smoking.49 Smokers estimate the risk at 40%. In contrast, scientific estimates of the lung cancer mortality risks from smoking are
considerably smaller—6% to 13%.50 Only nine percent of the sample
believes that the lung cancer risk is below five percent and only sixteen percent of the sample believes that risk to be at or below ten
percent. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the sample overestimates the lung cancer risks associated with smoking. These responses
to the lung cancer question could, however, be overstated to the extent that respondents include other smoking risks as part of their response to the lung cancer risk assessment.
what one would expect if people truly believed that the risks were going to affect them and not
simply others.
46. For a comparison of the implicit value of a job implied by these results and by other
studies, see W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 61-63 & tbl. 4-2 (1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI,
FATAL TRADEOFFS].
47. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
48. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 100.
49. Because almost all cases of lung cancer are fatal, using the lung cancer fatality risk reference point for judging the accuracy of lung cancer risk perceptions is a close approximation
to the risk of lung cancer overall. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services observed in a 1982 report: “The five-year survival rate for lung cancer is less than 10%. See Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report, February 26, 1982/31(7); 77-80. In a more recent study,
estimates suggested that the lung cancer mortality rate was 94% of the value of the overall lung
cancer incidence rate. More specifically, but 1986 the lung cancer incidence rate was 55.5 per
100,000 persons and the lung cancer death rate was 52.1 per 100,000 persons. See Mortality and
Morbidity Weekly Report, December 7, 1990/39(48); 875, 881-883.
50. See id. at 70 tbl.4-3 (reporting 1991 estimates). These estimates were based on U.S.
government sources, including Reports of the Surgeon General of the United States. See id. at
70 n.23. Since the original sources did not calculate the probability, I used their statistics on total illnesses and deaths to calculate the probability in my book. See id.
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TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTIONS OF LUNG CANCER AND DEATH RISK PERCEPTIONS
FOR CIGARETTE SMOKING
Lung cancer riska

Risk range

Death riskb

Frequency in

Frequency in

Frequency in

Frequency in

full sample

current smok-

full sample

current smokers

ers

a

b

Risk < 0.05

0.055

0.094

0.040

0.068

0.05<Risk<=0.10

0.044

0.056

0.037

0.056

0.10<Risk<=0.20

0.092

0.112

0.081

0.107

0.20<Risk<=0.30

0.124

0.137

0.110

0.115

0.30<Risk<=0.40

0.085

0.107

0.078

0.085

0.40<Risk<=0.50

0.033

0.034

0.067

0.077

0.50<Risk<=0.60

0.212

0.223

0.192

0.226

0.60<Risk<=0.70

0.077

0.052

0.069

0.073

0.70<Risk<=0.80

0.109

0.090

0.119

0.064

0.80<Risk<=0.90

0.065

0.021

0.077

0.026

0.90<Risk<=0.99

0.057

0.021

0.072

0.051

Risk = 1.00

0.047

0.052

0.056

0.051

Mean risk

0.468

0.395

0.501

0.424

sample size

981

233

982

234

Out of every 100 cigarette smokers, how many of them do you think
will develop lung cancer because they smoke?
Out of every 100 cigarette smokers, how many of them do you think
will die from lung cancer, heart disease, throat cancer, or any other
illness because they smoke cigarettes?

To account for this potential shortcoming, the survey included a
question on the overall fatality risk associated with smoking. Respondents were asked the following question: “Out of every 100
smokers, how many of them do you think will die from lung cancer,
heart disease, throat cancer, or any other illness because they smoke
cigarettes?” It should be emphasized that the phrasing of this question elicited an aggregate response to all risks rather than asking for
each mortality separately—such a piecemeal approach conceivably
could result in a higher aggregate estimated death risk. As the results
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in Table 3 indicate, overall, people believe that there is a 50% chance
of dying from smoking, with current smokers believing that the
chance is 42%.
Once again, these responses are considerably higher than the actual mortality risks of smoking, but to a lesser extent than were the
responses to the lung cancer question. Scientists have estimated that
the lifetime mortality risk from smoking ranges from 18% to 36%. 51
Thus, the average mortality risk assessed by smokers exceeds even
the upper bound of the scientists’ estimates of the mortality risk
level.
Although these results indicate a general awareness of risk, one
might hypothesize the existence of particular problem groups that are
not as aware of the risks associated with cigarettes. Young smokers
are one group that has received substantial recent attention. The 1985
cigarette smoking survey included some respondents ages sixteen to
twenty-one.52 A common belief is that younger smokers are ignorant
of the risks of smoking. However, these younger respondents assessed a higher risk of lung cancer than did older segments of society—49% for the young group versus 43% for the sample as a
whole.53 This is not surprising, however, since this younger generation
has been raised in a much stronger anti-smoking environment than
were their parents.
More qualitative evidence tells much the same story. The Monitoring the Future Project asked high school seniors a series of questions regarding their perceptions of the riskiness and attractiveness of
smoking.54 These students seemed quite aware that smoking is risky,
and this belief has grown over time. The percentage that believe that
smoking a pack or more a day holds great risk increased from 56% in
1976 to 69% in 1991.55 In 1991, 72% of these seniors considered
smoking a dirty habit, 74% preferred to date nonsmokers, and 61%
believed that becoming a smoker reflects poor judgment.56

51. See id.
52. See id. at 62. To reflect the rising legal smoking age, the 1997 survey focused on respondents age 18 and above. Thus, more recent data on youth smoking are not available.
53. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 123 tbl.6-2.
54. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH & TOBACCO: PREVENTING
TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 66 tbl.18
(U.S. Dep’t of Educ. ed., 1995).
55. See id.
56. See id.
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Table 4 illustrates the extent to which risk assessments are insensitive to the kinds of basic smoking information that are included in
the various cigarette warnings.
TABLE 4. PROFILE OF GROUPS WHO HAVE HEARD IDEAS ABOUT
CIGARETTE SMOKING

Fractions who have heard idea, their mortality risk perception,
and, in parentheses, standard error of mean risk
Full sample
Heard

Cigarette smoking will

0.968

most likely shorten life

Cigarette smoking is dan-

Current smoker Former smoker

Risk

Heard

0.473

0.967

(0.009)

0.986

gerous to a person’s

0.471

Risk

Heard

0.399

0.981

(0.019)

0.984

(0.009)

0.396

Nonsmoker

Risk

Heard

0.462

0.961

(0.019)

0.992

(0.018)

0.464

Risk

0.516
(0.013)

0.984

(0.019)

0.513
(0.013)

health

Cigarette smoking is bad 0.361
for a person’s health, but

0.454

0.329

(0.016)

0.388

0.327

(0.030)

0.413

0.397

(0.035)

0.499
(0.021)

not dangerous

Cigarette smoking is not

0.314

bad for a person’s health

Cigarette smoking causes 0.032
flat feet

0.473

0.222

(0.017)

0.510
(0.052)

0.339

0.322

(0.037)

0.016

0.215
(0.076)

0.452

0.356

(0.034)

0.033

0.369
(0.091)

0.523
(0.021)

0.039

0.638
(0.057)

The various rows of Table 4 correspond to the kinds of statements that people may have heard regarding smoking, ranging from
“cigarette smoking will most likely shorten life” to defenses of cigarette smoking, such as “cigarette smoking is not bad for a person’s
health.” The final question, whether “cigarette smoking causes flat
feet,” is designed to distinguish individuals who either are particularly ill-informed or are not giving reasoned responses to the survey
questions. Virtually everyone in the sample—from 97% to 99% per-
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cent—had heard each of the two adverse statements regarding the
risks of cigarettes. Moreover, one’s smoking status did not affect
whether one had heard either of these types of statements regarding
cigarette risks. In contrast, roughly one-third of the sample had heard
the various statements exonerating cigarettes of risk. Perhaps surprisingly, it is current smokers who exhibit the lowest fraction of
people—just 22%—who had heard that “cigarette smoking is not bad
for a person’s health.” Clearly, the hazards of smoking are not a secret, and are not unknown to smokers themselves.
In addition to listing what fraction of the sample had heard the
various ideas concerning cigarettes, Table 4 lists the associated mortality risk perception conditional upon both hearing the particular
statement and falling into the sample group designated by the column
heading. Thus, for the full sample who had heard that “cigarette
smoking is not bad for a person’s health” the risk value is the average
mortality risk only for people who had heard this statement. People
who have not heard it are excluded from this calculation. In every
case, smokers have a lower risk assessment than nonsmokers and
former smokers, even though they have heard the same particular
type of information. Nevertheless, the risk assessments are quite high
for smokers. To the extent that a lower assessed risk of smoking will
lead one to be more willing to engage in smoking behavior, the lower
risk beliefs of smokers are not unexpected.
In order to fully understand the risks associated with smoking,
people must also understand what length of life is at stake. For example, if people underestimate the life expectancy that will be lost
due to smoking, then even an accurate assessment of the probability
of premature mortality will lead to an inadequate assessment of the
risk. To address this issue the survey asked people the life expectancy
questions indicated in the notes beneath Table 5.
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TABLE 5. RESPONDENTS’ ASSESSED LIFE EXPECTANCY LOSS DUE TO
SMOKING
Mean
(standard error of the mean)
Sample
Full sample
Current smokers
Current nonsmokers
Former smokers
Never smoked

a

Malesa

Femalesb

Total

10.1

14.8

12.6

(0.4)

(0.4)

(0.3)

7.9

12.3

9.9

(0.7)

(0.8)

(0.5)

10.9

15.5

13.4

(0.4)

(0.4)

(0.3)

9.6

14.8

12.3

(0.6)

(0.7)

(0.5)

11.6

15.8

14.0

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.4)

(Asked Males Only) As you may know, an average 21-year old male would be
expected to live to the age of 73. What do you think the life expectancy is for the
average male smoker?

b

(Asked Females Only) As you may know, an average 21-year old female would
be expected to live to the age of 80. What do you think the life expectancy is for
the average female smoker?

Thus, the respondent was informed of the average life expectancy for the person’s gender group and then asked what he or she
believed was the average life expectancy for the average smoker of
the person’s gender group. Table 5 shows the difference, for various
groups of respondents, between the respondents’ estimated life expectancy for a smoker and the average life expectancy. So, for example, male former smokers estimated that the average male smoker
will live 9.6 fewer years than will the average nonsmoker. Overall,
people believe that cigarette smoking leads to a life expectancy loss
of 12.6 years. The assessed life expectancy loss by current smokers is
somewhat less, ranging from 7.9 years for males to 12.3 years for females. Each of these life expectancy loss estimates is greater than the
actual life expectancy lost, which estimates suggest is probably in the
vicinity of 3.6 to 7.2 years.57 As in the case of the mortality risk prob-

57.

These and other life expectancy loss estimates appear in VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra
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ability assessments, the evidence suggests that smokers believe the
risks to be lower than do nonsmokers, but that smokers nevertheless
overestimate the hazards associated with smoking.
People also appear to be aware of the difficulty of quitting
smoking. For decades, the Surgeons General of the United States
designated smoking as a problem of habituation rather than addiction.58 More recently, then-Surgeon General C. Everett Koop attributed the difficulty of quitting smoking to “addiction.”59 Although the
character of the medical designation has changed, in each case the
basic thrust of the message is the same—quitting smoking is hard.
The article by Joni Hersch in this issue of the Duke Law Journal presents the pertinent data.60 When polled regarding the difficulty of
quitting, 13% of smokers indicated that smoking is addictive, 26%
said that it is a habit, 57% indicated that it is both a habit and an addiction, and only 4% said that it was neither.61 Still, while changing
smoking behavior is difficult, it is not impossible. Millions of Americans have quit smoking—about half of all people who have ever been
smokers.62
The evidence is less extensive on the public awareness of the
hazards associated with environmental tobacco smoke (second-hand
smoke). Nonetheless, there appears to be some evidence that people
have been aware of these risks for some time. In 1977, sixty-eight
percent of the respondents to a Gallup poll indicated that they supported specified areas set aside for smoking, sixteen percent favored
no smoking in public areas, and only ten percent supported no restrictions on smoking in public places.63 By 1988, sixty percent of the
population supported a complete ban of smoking in all public places.
Presumably, this change has not occurred simply because of a con-

note 6, at 80.
58. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB.
NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 349-54 (1964).
59. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO.
(CDC) 88-8406, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 9 (1988).
60. See Hersch, supra note 25, at 1157.
61. See id. For more discussion of the smoking-related beliefs of teens, see id. at 1158-61.
62. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. (CDC) 90-8416, THE
HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 593-94
tbl.4 (1990).
63. The Gallup Poll statistics reported in this paragraph are summarized in VISCUSI,
SMOKING, supra note 6, at 52 tbl.3-3.
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cern with the smell of smoke, which has always been well known.
Awareness of the health risks to third persons has surely been
heightened by recent widespread concern with environmental tobacco smoke,64 and by the smoking restrictions implemented by private entities such as restaurants and businesses.65
The overwhelming implication of these different sets of statistics
is that people are generally aware of the hazards of smoking. As a
consequence, it is unlikely that additional hazard warnings intended
simply to alert people to the general risks of smoking will have much
effect. This does not imply that there is no informational role that the
government can play. It does suggest, however, that a truly useful
campaign would need to be more imaginative, and more than just a
minor variation on past informational approaches.
How might one respond to this evidence suggesting that smokers
understand the risks? Elsewhere in this issue, Paul Slovic offers four
possible critiques.66 First, he argues that assessing that there is a
probability of some adverse outcome does not imply that people understand the severity of the outcome.67 However, in my surveys the
outcome is a well-defined severe health outcome, including lung cancer, death, and life expectancy loss. Death and cancer are among the
most highly valued and severe health consequences.
A second shortcoming that he suggests is that people may be
subject to an optimism bias and not believe that the risks will actually
affect them.68 If that were the case, then we would not observe the
64. See generally Good Morning America: New Second-Hand Smoke Study (ABC television broadcast, May 20, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting on
new study which found that regular exposure to second-hand smoke doubles the risk of heart
attacks in female nonsmokers); Second-Hand Smoke Hurts Millions of Children Study, Reuters
World Service, Apr. 9, 1996 (“Four million children are sent to a doctor each year because they
are affected by second-hand smoke.”); Asthma, Bronchitis; Second-Hand Smoke Blamed for
Attacks Among Young, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1998, at C7; Second-Hand Smoke May Increase
Heart Disease in Young, MED. INDUSTRY TODAY, Sept. 4, 1997; Second-Hand Smoke Increases
Risk of Childhood Ear Infections, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 9, 1998.
65. Many hotels, for example, have established non-smoking floors. See James T. Yenckel,
Hotel Rooms for Nonsmokers, WASH. POST, June 14, 1987, at E1. The Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) issued a standard in January 1991 requiring acute-care hospitals to be smoke-free effective January 1992. See Anne M. Joseph, Determinants of Compliance with a National Smoke-Free Hospital Standard, 274 JAMA 491, 491
(1995). Hospitals have been very receptive to this standard. See Daniel R. Longo et al., Smoking Bans in U.S. Hospitals: Results of a National Survey, 274 JAMA 488, 489 (1995) (reporting
that 95.6% of the 3,327 U.S. hospitals surveyed were in compliance with the JCAHO standard).
66. See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE L.J. 1133 (1998).
67. See id. at 1133.
68. See id. at 1135.
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strong relationship between smoking risk probabilities and the likelihood of smoking that is now observed. Moreover, the aforementioned survey evidence does indicate that smokers already believe
that they have suffered adverse health consequences. Indeed, Slovic’s
own research on adolescents fails to indicate any significant difference between risks to oneself and one’s peers.69
Slovic’s third potential criticism is that these risk questions do
not address the repetitive and cumulative nature of the risk.70 However, asking about lifetime mortality risks and life expectancy loss
quite explicitly does capture the long-term health consequences of
smoking hazards. Moreover, Slovic’s discussion of cumulative risks
confuses two quite different concepts—a repetition of independent
and identical risks over time versus a nonlinear dose-response relationship for repeated exposures to a particular hazard.
His final criticism is that smokers do not understand that smoking is addictive.71 Once again, this unsupported claim is not borne out
by the aforementioned survey evidence, which indicates that smokers
are almost unanimous in believing that smoking is habit forming, addictive, or both. Quite simply, people know that quitting smoking is
hard to do.
The original survey evidence offered by Slovic, based on a survey at one high school, in no way addresses any of these four problems that he raises. Typical of the type of question he asks is whether
the respondent agrees that “[e]very single cigarette smoked causes a
little bit of harm.”72 What is meant by this, either in terms of the likelihood of the harm or the character of the harm is not specified and
interpretations may vary across respondents. His questions are particularly subject to his first criticism of smoking risk perception
analyses, which is that people may not understand the severity of the
consequences involved.
Moreover, none of his questions address the role of optimism
bias any more than do the questions analyzed in my studies. Similarly, his third and fourth criticisms, that studies must address the
cumulative and addictive nature of the risk, once again are not ad-

69. See Benthin et. al., A Psychometric Study of Adolescent Risk Perception, 16 JOURNAL
ADOLESCENCE 153, 162 (1993). The data presented indicate a personal risk to the smoker
of 4.31 and risks to one’s peers of 4.42, based on a 7 point scale.
70. See Slovic, supra note 66, at 1137.
71. See id. at 1138.
72. Id. at 1136.
OF
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dressed with any more concreteness and specificity than is achieved
by my questions that explore the perceived life expectancy associated
with smoking or inquire about whether respondents believe that
smoking is habit forming or addictive.
Any meaningful study of smoking risk beliefs ultimately must
involve a well defined quantitative metric in which it is possible to ascertain whether the individual over-assesses or under-assesses the
risk based on the survey response. My smoking risk questions permit
such an assessment. However, the qualitative questions posed by
Slovic that ask people to assess degrees of agreement with statements
such as, “[t]here is really no risk at all for the first few years,”73 do not
permit one to make any precise judgments as to whether the people
surveyed correctly perceive the risk. What, for example, is the correct
response to such statements? Strongly agree? Agree? Disagree?
Strongly disagree? Slovic’s qualitative measures are without empirical content, as they fail to enable us to make any judgment regarding
whether smokers overestimate or underestimate the risks associated
with smoking.
III. REGULATORY OPPORTUNITIES
To get a sense of the potential opportunities for beneficial cigarette regulation it is helpful to analyze the manner in which cigarette
regulations have affected smoking behavior to date. A useful starting
point is to analyze the trends in cigarette consumption over time.
Figure 1 provides information on two significant cigarette consumption trends over the past half century.
The solid line represents the number of cigarettes consumed per
capita over the last half century. The dotted line represents the per
capita cigarette consumption adjusted for the level of tar in the cigarettes. The tar rating for cigarettes is a widely publicized single summary statistic that is indicative of the chemical hazards in the cigarette.74

73. Id.
74. The degree to which tar levels are correlated with the riskiness of cigarettes remains a
matter of dispute. Lower-tar cigarettes appear to reduce the lung cancer risks of smoking, but
not many of the other hazards. See OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25
YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 316 (1989) [hereinafter DHSS,
REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING].
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Figure 1. U. S. Per Capita Cigarette Consumption and Tar-Adjusted
Consumption, 1944-1994
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The trend in smoking consumption has been consistently downward since the mid-1970s. On the other hand, from the mid-1960s to
the mid-1970’s, per capita consumption was flat—and per capita consumption actually rose significantly from 1944 to 1964. Thus, the major effect of the initial wave of cigarette warnings, enacted in 1965,
was to flatten the growth in cigarette consumption rather than to reverse the trend and generate a decline in consumption. By the mid1990s, per capita cigarette consumption had declined from its peak
but was not substantially below its level of fifty years earlier.
The trend for tar-adjusted cigarette consumption reflects a much
starker shift in cigarette smoking behavior. Whereas cigarettes averaged 46.1 mg. tar per cigarette in 1944, by 1994 the average tar level
in cigarettes was 12.0 mg. Tar-adjusted cigarette consumption is calculated by weighting the per capita consumption figures for a given
year by the tar level in that year relative to its 1944 level. If one were
to assume for simplicity that the risk of cigarettes is linearly related
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to their tar level, then over this fifty-year period the risk of cigarettes
would have declined by almost three-fourths.
The dramatic decline in the tar-adjusted per capita consumption
of cigarettes reflects an apparent desire on the part of smokers to reduce the riskiness of smoking cigarettes. To the extent that smokers
are responding to health concerns, they have done so primarily by
choosing lower-tar cigarettes.75
A particularly dramatic decline in average tar levels occurred
from 1957 to 1960. This period, which has been called the great “Tar
Derby,” was one during which cigarette companies competed in
terms of the tar levels of their cigarettes.76 Cigarette companies’ advertisements touted the lower tar levels of their brands as compared
to that of other brands. Kent cigarettes, for example, claimed that
they had “significantly less tars and nicotine than any other filter
brand.”77 A Marlboro ad declared: “Today’s Marlboro—22% less tar,
34% less nicotine.”78 Duke cigarettes touted the fact that their product offered the “lowest tar of all lo-tar cigarettes.”79
As a result, during this very short period of the great Tar Derby,
the average tar and nicotine levels of cigarettes purchased by consumers decreased by one-third.80 Competition by cigarette companies
with respect to the safety dimension of their products elicited a substantial consumer response. Unfortunately, this progress was not
permanent. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) did not embrace
this low-tar competition and instead negotiated an industry agreement to ban tar and nicotine advertising in 1960.81 Although the official rationale for this action remains unclear,82 it played an obstructionist role by discouraging the provision of safety-related
information about cigarettes to consumers and by impeding the pub-

75. See Laura Klepacki, Low-tar Brands Light Up Cigarette Category, SUPERMARKET
NEWS, Jan. 28, 1991, at 21 (“Health warnings and antismoking campaigns have caused some
smokers to cut back. But many, rather than quit, are switching to low- and very-low-tar cigarettes.”).
76. The “Tar Derby” is discussed in VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 39-40. For a more
detailed discussion, see JOHN E. CALFEE, FTC WORKING PAPER NO. 134, CIGARETTE
ADVERTISING, HEALTH INFORMATION AND REGULATION BEFORE 1970 (1985).
77. CALFEE, supra note 76, at 35-36.
78. Id. at 36.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 37 n.138.
81. See VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 39-40.
82. See id. One possibility is that the Surgeon General did not support low-tar cigarettes.
See id.; CALFEE, supra note 76, at 45.
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lic’s ability to choose lower-tar cigarettes. Due in part to the pressure
exerted by the American Cancer Society to reverse this ill-conceived
policy of suppressing tar and nicotine information,83 the FTC relented
and ultimately permitted tar and nicotine advertising. The initial step
was the publication of tar and nicotine levels by the FTC in 1967.84 By
1971, a new voluntary industry agreement required cigarette companies to disclose tar and nicotine levels.85
A final noteworthy pattern in Figure 1 is the flattening of the taradjusted cigarette consumption levels in the 1990s. The rise of generic cigarettes, and their associated high tar levels,86 may have led to
a flattening of the decline in tar-adjusted consumption amounts. This
phenomenon highlights a potential danger of regulating cigarettes in
a way that would make cigarette brands indistinguishable.87 All cigarettes are not equally risky. Suppose, for example, that suppressing
cigarette advertising and brand identification led consumers to have
less brand attachment and to focus more on the price rather than on
the quality of cigarettes. In such a case, cheaper cigarettes would become relatively more attractive. If these cigarettes also tended to
have higher tar and nicotine levels, as is the case with current generic
cigarettes, then the effect of such a policy could be to increase rather
than to decrease the risks of smoking.
Underlying this discussion is an implicit assumption that smokers
now attempt to match the kind of cigarettes they purchase with their
concern for the health hazards of cigarettes. Available evidence indicates that such matching does in fact occur. Overall, 87.1% of people
who smoke low-tar cigarettes (≤ 3 mg. tar/cigarette) express concerns
about the health consequences of smoking.88 In contrast, only 54.8%
of those who smoke high-tar cigarettes (≥ 21 mg. tar/cigarette) express such health concerns.89
It would be very useful if the government provided risk ratings
for cigarettes. Current tar and nicotine ratings provide partial infor-

83. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 40; CALFEE, supra note 76, at 55.
84. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 40.
85. See id.
86. See Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, supra note 40,
at 62.
87. One such possibility would be plain cigarette packaging in which the color on packages
and distinctive lettering would be replaced by tombstone advertising in which only the brand
name was indicated in black and white.
88. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 6, at 150 & 152 n.9.
89. See id.
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mation, but this information is neither complete nor conclusive. For
example, there is a theory that people tend to inhale lower-tar cigarettes more deeply, thus effectively increasing the risks of such cigarettes.90 If this hypothesis is true, the risk of smoking a product is not
fully captured by a simple assessment of its tar rating.
Asking the individual consumer to research such scientific issues
is unreasonable. Trial and error with different kinds of cigarettes may
be instructive with respect to immediate health effects, such as shortness of breath, but it does not provide sufficient information with respect to the longer-term consequences of smoking. The government
could play a productive role by gathering and disseminating research
regarding the health hazards of cigarettes. The government could accomplish this by funding its own central research effort, so as to avoid
the duplicative efforts of research by each individual cigarette company. This effort could be financed by cigarette taxes. In addition,
governmental research would presumably have more credibility than
would privately funded research efforts, which the public might view
more skeptically because of the role of the private vested interests.
Another possible governmental role might be to establish standards and to review the scientific research undertaken by the cigarette industry. In this scenario, the cigarette industry itself would presumably assume responsibility for testing new brands and their health
consequences, just as pharmaceutical companies are responsible for
testing the implications of new pharmaceutical formulations. In the
case of prescription drugs, the FDA has established testing guidelines
to which pharmaceutical companies must adhere as part of the testing
process.91 The FDA then reviews these test results and mandates additional study if necessary.92 Similarly, the FDA could establish
guidelines for testing alternative cigarette products and rating their
safety. As with any valid scientific procedure, the results of such tests
should be replicable so that any scientist who performed the tests in

90. The FTC has recently proposed analyzing cigarette smoke for tar and nicotine levels
using a test that simulates intakes for those smokers who take more and deeper drags from
their cigarettes. See Jeff Levine & Donald Van de Marck, New Tobacco Advertising (CNN-FN
broadcast, Sept. 10, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The new method
could produce results that reflect tar and nicotine levels that are four to five times higher than
those found using the standard method. Id.
91. The detailed requirements relating to test phases may be found in 21 C.F.R. § 312(a)(c) (1998).
92. See id.
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conformance with the FDA guidelines would generate the same results.
IV. PROMOTING SAFER CIGARETTES
The FDA could play a highly productive role by rating the comparative safety of cigarettes, thus providing consumers with information that would enable them to better match their choices of cigarettes with their own risk preferences. One could envision a rating
system that captured not only the risk characteristics of cigarettes,
but also additional factors, such as the manner in which different
kinds of cigarettes are smoked.93 In this manner, the FDA could publish comparative risk ratings for cigarettes that would enable consumers to assess the relative riskiness of their choices.
This kind of informational function has a substantial history in
other areas. Point of purchase displays in supermarkets, for example,
are often helpful in guiding consumers in their choice of products
based on their nutritional value.94 Comparative information about the
bad attributes, such as salt or fat content, can have a greater effect on
consumer choice than does information about positive attributes,
such as vitamin content.95 Thus, consumers often use comparative information to target aspects of a product that they wish to avoid.
Comparative risk ratings of cigarettes would highlight the health hazards of cigarettes, thus providing the kind of information that would
be particularly useful to health-conscious consumers.
Comparative risk information for cigarettes is not, however, tantamount to simply listing the chemical composition of cigarettes.
Knowing that cigarettes contain, for example, arsenic, formaldehyde,
or other chemicals would not be particularly instructive—even to a
cancer specialist—without knowledge of the quantities in the cigarette smoke. To maximize usefulness, therefore, the information
should be provided in a manner that does not require the consumer
to make a risk assessment based on a chemical list, but instead provides an overall risk rating that summarizes the risk implications in a
manner that can be understood. Such a risk rating need not be a sin-

93. Thus, if smokers tend to inhale low-tar cigarettes more deeply, the rating system could
reflect this.
94. See J. Edward Russo et al., Nutrition Information in the Supermarket, 13 J. CONSUMER
RES. 48, 48-70 (1986).
95. See id. at 49 (“Survey evidence reveals that consumers see both positive and negative
nutrients as important, but emphasize the negative.”).
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gle summary statistic. It may prove useful, for example, to have risk
indices on multiple dimensions, such as cancer, heart disease, and
respiratory ailments.
Formulating the risk information in such a manner could also
eliminate some of the current distractions over cigarette additives.
States such as Massachusetts have passed laws requiring disclosure of
additive information,96 and cigarette companies have already begun
to respond by offering additive-free cigarettes, such as a Winston
cigarette that contains no additives.97 In terms of the overall risk,
though, concern over additives is akin to concern about whether the
car that ran you over also had lead paint on it. Cigarette smoking is a
tremendously risky activity even using cigarettes without flavor enhancers or other artificial additives. The warnings effort should focus
consumers’ attention on the overall riskiness of each type of cigarette, rather than on potential distractions that could lull consumers
into overestimating the safety of additive-free cigarettes.
Rating the comparative risks of cigarettes is, to a large extent,
simply an extension of the current informational approach. Conceivably the FDA could also take the lead in fostering much more
ambitious changes in the character of cigarettes. In much the same
way as health, safety, and environmental regulations require safer
plants and equipment and safer products,98 the FDA likewise could
act to promote the design of cigarettes with safer properties.

96. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 307B (West Supp. 1998). While the Liggett
Group eventually chose to comply with the law, see Adrian Walker, Liggett Lists Cigarette Ingredients, Becomes 1st Tobacco Firm to Support Mass. Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1997, at
C6, other tobacco companies threatened to pull their products from the Massachusetts market
while they reformulate their ingredients, see Frank Phillips, Tobacco Firms Mull Move Out of
Mass.; Could Pull Brands Over Disclosure Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1996, at B1, and
brought a suit to block implementation of the law, arguing that the law forces them to reveal
trade secrets. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. Civ.A. 96-11599-6A0, 1997 WL
106930, at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 1997). The federal district court judge granted a temporary restraining order, noting that the industry had demonstrated “a sufficient likelihood of success” in
showing that the law is unconstitutional. See Frank Phillips, Ruling Stalls Tobacco Disclosure
Law; Future of Legislation in Question, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1997, at B1.
97. See “All-Natural” Ads Boost Winston Sales, NEWS & REC. (GREENSBORO, N.C.), Jan.
14, 1998, at B4; Melanie Wells, Winston Scores with “Additive-Free” Ads, USA TODAY, Oct.
30, 1997, at 6B. The Winston ads have been attacked for being misleading by suggesting that
the additive-free cigarettes are healthier than regular cigarettes. See Michael Murphy, Tobacco
Billboards Targeted; Woods Asks Judge to Pull Winston’s “No Bull” Ads, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Mar. 6, 1998, at B1.
98. See generally VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 46, at 148 (offering a detailed
discussion of health, safety, and environmental regulations in this context); STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (same).
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Consider the two traditional risk components of cigarettes—tar
and nicotine. In the case of nicotine, which is primarily linked to the
difficulty of quitting smoking, Philip Morris introduced several virtually nicotine-free cigarettes under the brand names Next and MeritFree that were test marketed in 1991.99 Rather than welcome these
products, anti-smoking groups petitioned the FDA to designate nicotine as a drug and to initiate a broader range of regulatory actions
against cigarettes.100
Perhaps the greatest technological innovation affecting cigarettes was the development of the Premier cigarette by R.J. Reynolds.101 The Premier, which has subsequently been tested and marketed in a new design under the brand name Eclipse, does not burn
tobacco.102 Rather, in its initial design, the smoker lit a carbon tip at
the end of the cigarette.103 This tip in turn heated a capsule filled with
porous beads coated with tobacco extract.104 This vapor then traveled
through tobacco papers to release even more tobacco flavor.105
Notwithstanding the technological sophistication of the new design, the Premier closely resembled conventional cigarettes in many
respects. It had the external appearance of a cigarette—the smoker
would smoke it in the same fashion and would hold it in the same
manner. The Premier also delivered the nicotine level associated with
conventional cigarettes. There was, however, one stark change. Since
it did not burn tobacco the Premier caused less adverse biological activity than do other cigarettes.106 Carbon monoxide risks remained,
but the mainstream and sidestream smoke condensates were all less
genotoxic than those of reference cigarettes.107
99. See Martin Wolk, Phillip Morris Tests New Low-Nicotine Cigarette, REUTER BUS.
REPORT, May 31, 1989; Douglas C. McGill, Low-Nicotine Cigarette for Philip Morris, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1989, at D1.
100. See Groups Seek FDA Regulation of “De-Nicotined” Cigarettes, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8,
1991, at C3.
101. The general properties of the Premier cigarette are discussed in VISCUSI, FATAL
TRADEOFFS, supra note 46 at 23-24, and are explored thoroughly in R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO
CO., CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL STUDIES ON NEW CIGARETTE PROTOTYPES THAT HEAT
INSTEAD OF BURN TOBACCO (1988) [hereinafter RJR STUDIES].
102. See Jeremy Pearce, New Cigarette Releases 90% Less Smoke, Yields Less Tar, DET.
NEWS, June 9, 1996.
103. See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 46, at 23.
104. See id.
105. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 2, at 146-47.
106. See RJR STUDIES, supra note 101, at xii.
107. See id. at 11 & tbl. 5. RJR did not limit its analysis to Premier cigarettes alone, but
rather analyzed the reduced risk associated with smokeless cigarettes generally as well. See id.
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Marketing this “safer” cigarette was a nontrivial task since cigarette companies are not permitted to make health claims on behalf of
their products.108 The Premier packaging referred to the “cleaner
smoke,” which was not a health claim but a reference to its overall
smokeless character. The brochure attached to the cigarette pack described the Premier’s characteristics as follows:
Premier is the first cigarette you smoke by heating tobacco—not
burning it.
It’s a breakthrough that changes the very composition of cigarette
smoke—substantially reducing many of the controversial compounds found in the smoke of tobacco-burning cigarettes. Those that
remain include carbon monoxide, but the amount of carbon monoxide is no greater than in the best-selling “lights.” What it all comes
down to is a cleaner smoke—for you and everyone around you.
109

Viewed in abstract terms, cigarettes embody a number of characteristics. Many of these characteristics remained in the design of the
Premier. One principal characteristic that was affected was a reduction in the taste associated with cigarettes—an effect that I found differed in degree depending on whether the cigarette was of the regular
or menthol variety. In addition, the Premier did not burn tobacco,
thus eliminating all risks associated with that particular process.110
This new design was very much in the spirit of the technological design standards that have been mandated throughout the health,
safety, and environmental area by federal regulatory agencies. When
passengers in motor vehicles are unsafe, we mandate airbags and
seatbelts to protect them.111 Environmental regulations require the
use of scrubbers to eliminate pollutants.112 Technological solutions to
risk problems represent the dominant government form of intervention to address the hazards we face. Yet, in the context of cigarettes,
not only has there been no requirement of a technological nature impassim.
108. FDA regulations require that all health claims made on the label of a product be approved by the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (1998).
109. VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting language found on the label of Premier Cigarettes).
110. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
111. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1997).
112. For a detailed analysis of air pollution regulations, see ROBERT CRANDALL,
CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 5-16
(1983).
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posed on cigarette design, but the government has never taken any
active role in promoting design safety.
Instead, the reaction to the Premier cigarette was marked by an
attitude of suspicion and distrust. A 1989 U.S. Surgeon General’s report summarized these official concerns about the new product:
The marketing of a variety of alternative nicotine delivery systems
has heightened concern within the public health community about
the future of nicotine addiction. The most prominent development
in this regard was the 1988 test marketing by a major cigarette producer of a nicotine delivery device having the external appearance
113
of a cigarette and being promoted as “the cleaner smoke.”

To criticize this innovation because it was not the same as not
smoking at all is to miss the fundamental contribution of this product.
All products consist of multiple attributes, some of which affect risk
aspects of the product and others of which affect other aspects of
consumer demand. The Premier cigarette did not increase nicotine,
one of the major risk components which is linked to habituation and
addiction. Rather, the cigarette only manipulated two attributes,
taste and cancer risk. The Premier largely eliminated the cancer risk,
and the main price paid was a decrease in the taste provided to consumers. For smokers who claim that they smoke because they need to
do something with their hands, they enjoy the act of smoking, or they
enjoy the effect of the nicotine, this product would be a suitable alternative. For smokers for whom taste is an essential concern, on the
other hand, this new product would not be as attractive as conventional cigarettes.
One should not be too critical of deficiencies in major safety innovations, such as the lack of a good taste in Premier cigarettes. Over
time, as consumer demand for these products increases, there tends
to be additional innovation which rectifies some of the initial shortcomings. For example, the original lap only model of seatbelts has
been replaced by the more effective114 lap and shoulder harness.
Similarly, efforts are now underway to refine the design of airbags so

113. See DHSS, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, supra note 74, at
13.
114. National Safety Council President T.C. Gilchrist noted that, compared to lap-only
seatbelts, “three-point lap and shoulder harnesses provide the best protection.” Safety Council
Questions NTSB Seatbelt Study, UPI, Aug. 13, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
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that they do not pose as great a risk to smaller passengers.115 One
would expect similar improvements in the design and taste of alternative cigarette mechanisms that seek to reduce the hazards of smoking. If safer designs are promoted, or at least not discouraged, by the
government, and if safer products are purchased by consumers, companies will have a financial incentive to improve their products.
In the absence of official support from the public health community, R.J. Reynolds commissioned a wide range of medical studies to
document the greater safety of the Premier cigarette. Perhaps most
impressively, an advisory committee convened by the Emory University School of Medicine provided oversight of a series of studies assessing the hazards of the Premier cigarette.116 Together, these studies
thoroughly evaluated the design and methodology used in making the
product.117 As viewed by this committee, the cigarette design substantially achieved the stated objectives:
•

To simplify the chemical composition of mainstream and sidestream smoke emitted by the new cigarette.

•

To minimize the biological activity of the mainstream and sidestream smoke emitted by the new cigarette.

•

To achieve significant reduction of environmental tobacco
118
smoke from the new cigarette.

The committee commended these objectives and concluded that
they were substantially achieved through the research and development program.119
One of the many studies commissioned as part of this review involved the intake of tobacco smoke by animals. These tests supported
the view that the new cigarettes were safer: “Although the studies
were only of ninety-day duration they did clearly demonstrate the
decrease in adverse biological activity from the new cigarette when
compared to effects induced by smoke from reference cigarettes.”120

115. See Matthew L. Wald, Cutoff Switches for Car Airbags Will be Allowed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1997, at A1.
116. See RJR STUDIES, supra note 101, at vi, ix.
117. See id. at ix.
118. Id. at ix-x.
119. See id.
120. Id. at xii.
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The committee’s review of a study focusing on the presence of
mutagens in human urine was similarly positive:
[The committee] agreed that the urine mutagenicity results showed
a significant difference between persons smoking reference or new
cigarettes, and no difference between nonsmokers and smokers of
the new cigarette. The Committee also agreed with the conclusion
that, as assessed subjectively by nonsmokers, there was a substantial
reduction in the irritant properties of Environmental Tobacco
Smoke produced by the new cigarette compared to that of reference
121
cigarettes.

Finally, the report addressed the potential toxicity of the ingredients in the new cigarette, concluding once again that the evidence
supported the safety of the new cigarette design: “The information
presented states that the new cigarette is manufactured from components having little or no toxicity.”122
The carbon monoxide risks remained, so this product was not
entirely risk-free. Moreover, these studies, even though undertaken
by highly reputable medical researchers, may not resolve all scientific
issues.123 It is in this regard that the FDA could play a fundamental
policy role. Rather than having a company commission a medical
school to oversee a set of studies, the FDA could outline which types
of studies might be useful for making precise inferences regarding a
product’s safety. In the case of new cigarette designs, such as the
Premier, a two step approach might be desirable. First, the company
could commission a series of studies, as was done with the Premier,
and then the FDA could review the results of these studies. Based on
this review, the FDA could establish guidelines for additional research that would need to be undertaken in order to draw sufficiently
precise conclusions regarding the safety of the product.
The results of these studies in turn could be a part of the comparative risk rating of cigarettes and alternative cigarette designs.
Again, such a rating system might include information beyond an
overall risk figure. For example, pertinent dimensions might include
cancer risk; carbon monoxide; environmental tobacco smoke; and

121. Id. at xiii.
122. Id.
123. For example, these studies did not ascertain the long-term health risks from prolonged
exposure to the product.

VISCUSI FINAL.DOC

1998]

10/29/98 4:28 PM

CONSTRUCTIVE CIGARETTE REGULATION

1127

nicotine. One could also envision other sets of attributes that could
be conveyed to consumers to assist in their choice.124
Ideally it would be helpful to undertake field experiments to determine how the provision of different kinds of information affects
consumer risk beliefs and choices. The general spirit of these studies
would be similar to those that I have undertaken with several former
colleagues at Duke University.125 We undertook these studies for the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to provide them guidance in
the labeling of pesticides and hazardous chemicals. What we found is
that the structure and format of information greatly affected people’s
ability to process hazard warnings.126 The content of information is
consequently not the sole concern. Moreover, providing too much information can potentially be detrimental in that it can distract consumers’ attention from the basic message, or can create problems of
information overload.127
Oversimplifications, such as claiming that consumers cannot
process hazard warning information, are certainly not correct. Similarly, the other extreme, the hypothesis that consumers perfectly
process all information given to them and act upon this information,
also is not true. However, there does exist a wide body of literature
regarding the design of hazard warnings.128 Through appropriately designed experimental tests of alternative warning approaches, it is possible to ascertain which structures of information work and which do
not. Before embarking on a new risk rating policy for cigarettes, it
would be valuable to undertake such experimental studies so that we
could design the safety rating system to optimize its efficacy.

124. For example, the government could develop an overall index of the risk of heart disease or other major consequences of smoking. Thus, it might be possible to develop a list of
health outcomes of cigarettes, including possible addiction, and to rate the riskiness of different
cigarettes with respect to these hazards. Note that a carbon monoxide listing would not do this,
as carbon monoxide is a chemical exposure that leads to a potential outcome, rather than the
outcome itself.
125. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 41; MAGAT & VISCUSI,
INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION, supra note 41. The results of these studies
are reported throughout VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 46.
126. See, e.g., MAGAT & VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION, supra
note 41, at 16.
127. See id. at 14, 88-92, 103, 185-86.
128. See, e.g., MAGAT & VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION, supra
note 41, at 107-18; VISCUSI & MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 41, at 132-55.
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CONCLUSION
The most essential change that I am proposing in FDA policy is
that it undertake a constructive role in fostering technological innovations to promote cigarette safety. Such a stance would require a
shift in the attitude of the FDA toward the industry. The current attitude—the vehemently anti-cigarette stance—is reflected in the quest
for a smoke-free society by the year 2000.129 This kind of absolute
objective is unachievable. What can be achieved, however, is a reduction in the hazards associated with smoking. Official estimates place
the annual death total associated with cigarettes in the hundreds of
thousands.130 In light of these figures, the potential benefits from reducing risks of smoking are enormous.
The government’s policy objectives should include the promotion of informed choices. If a person chooses to smoke, such choice
should be based on a full understanding of the risks. The most beneficial role that the government could play would be to assist people in
making informed choices. In particular, this would involve providing
information regarding innovative safety features for cigarettes—an
action that would assist consumers in decreasing the health hazards
posed by smoking.
Adopting a stance that promotes the consumption of safer cigarettes will exploit perhaps the most powerful force in markets—
consumer choice.131 This century has witnessed a decline in many of
the risks we face: motor vehicle accident death rates are down,132 jobs
are safer,133 home accidents are down,134 and environmental hazards
are diminishing as well.135 In economic terms, people have a strong income elasticity for good health. As we become richer, we value our
health more. As a consequence, the increased affluence of the United
129. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop popularized the idea of a smoke-free future. See,
e.g., DHSS, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, supra note 74, at vii; C.
Everett Koop, A smoke-free society by the year 2000, 85 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 290-92 (1985).
130. See DHSS, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, supra note 74, at
22 (estimating that over 300,000 people per year die from smoking).
131. Market forces consist of two elements: supply and demand. Consumer choice is the
demand side of the market. Together with supply considerations, it determines market outcomes. For a review of consumer choice theory, see ANDREW MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 17-36 (1995). As noted therein: “The most fundamental decision unit
of microeconomic theory is the consumer.” Id. at 17.
132. See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 46, at 285.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 288.
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States and its citizenry will increase the demand over time for safer
cigarette products.
The dramatic reduction in cigarette tar levels reflected in Figure
1 illustrates the potential impact of market forces. People continue to
smoke, though not at the same levels as at the peak of smoking rates.
However, there has been a substantial downturn in the tar levels of
cigarettes as consumers have sought safer cigarette options. Technological devices such as the Premier cigarette would simply exploit the
consumer demand for safer products by matching safer cigarettes
with the preferences of consumers who seek to reduce the risks of
cigarettes.
Some people may be reluctant to adopt such an approach because it is not as uncompromising as a strict anti-smoking policy. But
the objective of government policy should be to promote the health
and welfare of the citizenry, not simply to restrict cigarette smoking
per se. The current policy approach of failing to promote safer cigarettes, in effect, is using death as the principal deterrent to reduce
smoking rates. While it is true that some people may choose to
smoke safer cigarettes rather than to give up smoking altogether, the
government should not be in the role of restricting technological devices that enhance safety and reduce the truly substantial risks of
smoking. Government cigarette regulation would promote smokers’
health if it were more supportive of such innovations than it has been
to date.
Moreover, this policy approach would not exclude a policy concern for youth smoking, which has received such substantial attention
in recent years.136 Society restricts decisions by youths in many ways.
States do not generally permit people to have drivers’ licenses until
age sixteen. There are minimum ages for voting, for joining the
armed forces, and for seeing certain movies. We impose these restrictions because we want people to gain sufficient maturity to ensure
that the decisions they make—which may have long-term consequences for their own lives or for the lives of others—will be sound.
Promotion of safer cigarette designs is in no way inconsistent with the
effort to discourage underage smoking and ultimately is based on a

136. Youth smoking is a principal target of both the Proposed Resolution to the cigarette
litigation and Senate Bill 1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, which includes penalties
levied on the cigarette companies if smoking does not decrease sufficiently. See S. 1415, 105th
Cong. § 201 (1997). Also see the discussion in Hersch, supra note 25, at 1140-42.
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similar concern—the importance of informed choice in making decisions that pose potentially substantial long-term risks.
The approach the government has taken traditionally with respect to smoking hazards is to require placement of warnings on cigarette packages and on cigarette advertising. The Proposed Resolution
of the cigarette litigation would expand the range of warnings further.137 It is unlikely, however, that simply modifying the existing
warnings will be effective. Although anti-smoking critics might assume that continued smoking must be attributable to ignorance of
smoking’s hazards, a detailed examination of a variety of risk perception measures indicate that this is not the case. Indeed, information
that cigarette smoking is hazardous is almost universally known, and
overall even smokers tend to overestimate rather than underestimate
the risks of smoking.
This result does not imply, however, that there is no informational role for the government to play. The government’s approach
simply needs to be much more subtle and refined than that of disseminating variations on the old theme that smoking is a very risky
pursuit. The informational strategy that I have advocated here is twofold. First, the FDA should develop a ratings system to indicate the
comparative riskiness of various types of cigarettes so that consumers
can better match the hazardousness of particular cigarettes to their
own preferences and their own health concerns. Second, the FDA
should undertake a vigorous role in fostering the development of
safer cigarette designs, in testing the efficacy of these new designs, in
rating the safety properties of these innovations, and in disseminating
information concerning these advances to consumers. Doing so will
exploit the powerful forces of consumer choice that have led to the
dramatic decline in tar levels in cigarettes over the past half century.
Would such an effort be effective in fostering safer decisions?
The stark shift in the tar levels of cigarettes is perhaps the best evidence that it would. More generally, warnings are effective in altering
behavior only when they convey new information in a convincing
manner. If the FDA can develop a credible system for rating the
comparative hazardousness of various types of cigarettes, and can
provide consumers with a type of risk information that they do not
currently have, then the Agency would be filling an informational
void and could potentially assist consumers in making sound decisions.
137.

See supra tbl.2.
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There are two prerequisites for success. First, the information
must be new rather than simply a recycled variant on the familiar
warnings. Second, it should be truthful and credible so that consumers can rely on this information when making their choices. The FDA
is the most natural actor to engage in such an undertaking. The cigarette companies individually could attempt such informational efforts, but these initiatives would neither be as credible nor as effective as a government-sanctioned program. Moreover, to the extent
that any such statements could be regarded as health claims for a
company’s product, the companies would be reluctant to risk regulatory sanctions for making such claims without FDA approval.
The idea of fostering safer cigarette designs is novel. Such a
function has never been a component of the anti-smoking efforts of
U.S. government agencies. This absence of a strong interest in fostering technological improvements to enhance cigarette safety stands
in striking contrast to the regulatory approach that exists elsewhere
throughout the health, safety, and environmental establishment. By
expanding the range of policy tools that are being used to address the
hazards of smoking, this effort would not only enhance the well-being
of smokers, who would be able to make informed choices from an
improved and expanded menu of options, but would also lead to potentially dramatic improvements in our national health.

